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Agency History and Timeline
Agency History and Timeline
1870
The legislature enacted provisions to "provide for the care of the poor" by funding county poor farms or houses in 1870.
1872
Governor: Franklin I. Moses, Jr. (Republican) (1872-1874)
1874
Governor: Daniel Henry Chamberlain (Republican) (1874-1876)
1876
Governor: Wade Hampton III (Democrat) (1876-1879) (resigned)
1879
Governor: William Dunlap Simpson (Democrat) (1879-1880) (not elected)
1880
Governor: Thomas Bothwell Jeter (Democrat) (1880-1880)
Governor: Johnson Hagood (Democrat) (1880-1882)
1882
Governor: Hugh Smith Thompson (Democrat) (1882-1886) (resigned)
1886
Governor: John Calhoun Sheppard (Democrat) (1886-1886) (not elected)
Governor: John Peter Richardson III (Democrat) (1886-1890)
1890
Governor: Benjamin Ryan Tillman (Democrat) (1890-1894)
1894
Governor: John Gary Evans (Democrat) (1894-1897)
1897
Governor: William Haselden Ellerbe (Democrat) (1897-1899) (died in office)
1899
Governor: Miles Benjamin McSweeney (Democrat) (1899-1903)
1903
Governor: Duncan Clinch Heyward (Democrat) (1903-1907)
1907
Governor: Martin Frederick Ansel (Democrat) (1907-1911)
1911
Governor: Coleman Livingston Blease (Democrat) (1911-1915) (resigned)
1915
Governor: Charles Aurelius Smith (Democrat) (1915-1915) (not elected)
Governor: Richard Irvine Manning III (Democrat) (1915-1919)
In 1915, the legislature established a State Board of Charities and Corrections, and five years later, it established a State Board of Public Welfare.
1919
Governor: Robert Archer Cooper (Democrat) (1919-1922) (resigned)
1922
Governor: Wilson Godfrey Harvey (Democrat) (1922-1923) (not elected)
1923
Governor: Thomas Gordon McLeod (Democrat) (1923-1927)
1927
Governor: John Gardiner Richards, Jr. (Democrat) (1927-1931)
1931
Governor: Ibra Charles Blackwood (Democrat) (1931-1935)
1935
Governor: Olin D. Johnston (Democrat) (1935-1939)
During the Depression, many social oriented programs were implemented to assist the nation in its recovery; among these was the Emergency Relief Administration. As an outgrowth of this agency, [a] temporary Department of Welfare was established in 1935.
1937
The South Carolina legislature permanently created the Department of Public Welfare in 1937.
1939
Governor: Burnet R. Maybank (Democrat) (1939-1941) (resigned)
1941
Governor: Joseph Emile Harley (Democrat) (1941-1942) (not elected, died in office)
1942
Governor: Richard Manning Jefferies (Democrat) (1942-1943) (not elected)
1943
Governor: Olin D. Johnston (Democrat) (1943-1945) (resigned)
1945
Governor: Ransome Judson Williams (Democrat) (1945-1947) (not elected)
1947
Governor: Strom Thurmond (Democrat) (1947-1951)
1951
Governor: James Francis Byrnes (Democrat) (1951-1955)
1955
Governor: George Bell Timmerman, Jr. (Democrat) (1955-1959)
1959
Governor: Ernest "Fritz" Hollings (Democrat) (1959-1963)
1963
Governor: Donald Stuart Russell (Democrat) (1963-1965) (resigned)
1965
Governor: Robert Evander McNair (Democrat) (1965-1971)
1971
Governor: John C. West (Democrat) (1971-1975)
1972
The Department of Welfare was renamed the Department of Social Services.
1975
Governor: James Burrows Edwards (Republican) (1975-1979)
1979
Governor: Richard Wilson Riley (Democrat) (1979-1987)
1984
The Department of Social Services contracted with Omni Systems, Inc., a consulting firm, for $160,000 to determine appropriate staffing levels for each DSS county office. DSS used this information to make county staffing decisions.
1985
February 1985 - The Legislative Audit Council (LAC) published a "Management and Performance Review" of DSS. Some of the findings included: (1) Child Protective Services (CPS) needed improvement; child abuse and neglect investigations were inadequate, treatment plans were not being used, and family court requirements were not being met; casework had also been inadequate; (2) delay in automation of the Child Support Enforcement Program had cost approximately $1.9 million annually in collection of child support payments; (3) failure to adequately collect funds owed the agency from providers and clients; over $6.6 million in delinquent debts was outstanding from doctors, dentists, hospitals, nursing homes, and clients; (4) federal penalties in the Food Stamp, Assistance for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and Medicaid programs because of excessive errors; which could have cost the State over $6 million in program and administrative funds. Also the review noted that, according to an Attorney General's opinion, the State had authority over all county DSS operations to ensure that corrective actions were implemented.
DSS contracted with Omni Systems, Inc., a consulting firm, for $204,613, to determine the proper staffing levels for the state offices. The purpose of the study was to provide DSS with the ability to monitor and update staffing levels in the state office. While DSS officials indicated the study was accurate and appropriately conducted, the Legislative Audit council found that the agency did not develop a formal plan for addressing the Omni study recommendations for the state office and, at the time of the 1991 LAC Study, had not updated the staffing analysis. According to the LAC Study, while DSS could have reduced staff in the state office through attrition and used that funding to hire additional staff in county offices, they remained over-staffed in the state office. According to LAC, DSS then made attempts to correct staffing shortages in county offices by requesting additional positions. LAC concluded that, as of May 1991, DSS had not documented improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of the state office as a result of the study on the state office which cost $204,613.
1987
Governor: Carroll A. Campbell, Jr. (Republican) (1987-1995)
1989
Since Omni Systems, Inc.'s update in 1988-89, DSS' human services quality assurance section had maintained current information on staffing levels, which were updated yearly using the Omni methodology.
Updates to the Omni staffing study indicated the county Human Services offices were understaffed by 335 caseworkers.
June 1989 - DSS implemented the Professional Academy for Self Sufficiency; the academy was first statewide coordinated training program for Economic Service workers. Before the academy, training varied from county to county. The academy was an initiative to reduce error rates in issuance of food stamps and monetary benefits to needy families, increase job satisfaction, and ensure consistent client services. The academy was based on the training program in Kentucky, the state with the lowest combined error rate in the southeast and in the top ten nationwide in FY 87-88.
1990
The agency's main program divisions in 1990 included: Office of Self-Sufficiency (i.e. Economic Services) and Office of Children, Family and Adult Services (i.e. Human Services).
Economic services was comprised of (1) economic support [AFDC, which later becomes Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and food stamps], (2) medical support (Medicaid), (3) work support, (4) economic assessment and quality control, which was federally mandated to develop the state’s error rates, and (5) child support enforcement (only operated from the state office).
Human services included: (1) child protective and preventive services (CPPS), (2) adult services, (3) substitute care (foster care), (4) program quality assurance, and (5) state’s adoption program (only operated from the state office).
The agency primarily served the public at the county level, with the exceptions of child support enforcement and birth parent services.
1991
May 1991 - The Legislative Audit Council published a "Limited-Scope Review" of DSS. Some of the findings included: (1) Higher ratio of central office administrative positions to direct client services positions than four states which were comparably structured; (2) Central office was staffed at 119 administrative positions above the average of similarly structured offices; (3) County offices were understaffed by 547 employees according to DSS staffing standards; (4) The estimated $2.5 million spent on these 119 [administrative] positions, based on the FY 89-90 average salary of $20,795 for state employees could have been used in the county offices to employ 162 entry-level caseworkers at the starting salary of $15,229; (5) Administrative costs for the AFDC and food stamp programs were higher than the average for 8 southeastern states in FY 88-89 and DSS error rates for FY 85-86 through 87-88 were higher than the southeastern average; (6) The state office did not effectively oversee the county programs in human services, but did a reasonably thorough job in economic services; and (7) By not requiring background checks on foster parents and not always enforcing training, fire and health regulations, DSS had not adequately protected foster children. LAC concluded that county caseworker turnover was comparable to turnover for other types of state employees.
Sections 43-1-80 and 43-1-90 of the South Carolina Code required DSS to supervise, administer and ensure compliance with the provisions of the statutes in a uniform manner throughout the state. To fulfill its responsibilities, DSS committed to a quality process outlined by Philip Crosby, a management expert. According to Crosby, an agency must prevent problems before they occur by providing consistent feedback and evaluation through self-monitoring and audits.
1995
Governor: David Muldrow Beasley (Republican) (1995-1999)
1999
Governor: James Hovis Hodges (Democrat) (1999-2003)
DSS implemented a continuous hiring process for counties in constant need of human services personnel. This process allowed counties to have positions posted continually through the state employment website. DSS human resources also continually screened applications and forwards them to the counties.
2001
DSS sustained a 35% reduction in its budget from FY 2001-02 through 2004-05.
March 2001 - DSS implemented a hiring freeze, with front-line human services positions, such as CPS caseworkers, exempted.
August 2001 - DSS implemented a retirement incentive and began voluntary separations. The hiring freeze remained in place, with human services positions exempted.
2003
Governor: Mark Sanford (Republican) (2003-2011)
February 2003 - The State Director of DSS implemented an agency-wide hiring freeze on all positions, including human services.
September 2003 - U.S. Department of Health and Human Services issued Round 1 final report on "South Carolina Child and Family Services Review." The evaluation used 7 outcome measures addressing a child's safety, well-being, and permanency of living situation, as well as 7 systemic factors including training, quality assurance system, and its case review system. The measures and factors addressed Child Protective Services in-home treatment cases and foster care cases. DSS was found not to be in substantial conformity on 6 of the 7 outcome measures relating to safety and 2 of the 7 systemic factors. When reviewing DSS’ quality assurance system, the review found DSS did not maintain a "…quality assurance system that evaluate[d] and measure[d] program strengths and areas needing improvement." In addition, the review noted that counties were only required to undergo a performance review once every 5 years and that this may not have been adequate to improve performance. In response to the review, DSS was required to develop a program improvement plan for implementation by June 2006.
2004
June 2004 - County offices were authorized to hire up to 90% of front-line staff.
Management training for staff remained discontinued due to budget constraints and limited resources.
2005
State Director: Kim S. Aydlett (2005-2007)
August 2005 - County directors were authorized to hire 100% of their caseworker positions.
December 2005 - DSS contracts with the Office of Human Resources (OHR) for a review of staffing, qualifications, salary, and turnover for caseworkers. OHR's report was due by March 2006, but OHR was asked to extend the scope of its review.
2006
Management training was reinstated.
Management orientation program was improved.
The "knowledge transfer" program providing for work continuation in specialized areas was instituted with strategies to improve managers' skills developed.
DSS requested funds to increase entry-level salaries for direct services workers, and began work with the Budget and Control Board to develop a pay plan that would help attract and retain competent staff.
The Federal General Accountability Office report ranked caseworker recruitment and retention among the top 3 challenges facing child welfare agencies working to improve outcomes for children. According to the report, turnover lowered morale, reduced efficiency, and consumed time as the agency recruited, hired, and trained new workers.
The Legislative Audit Council found that DSS had not analyzed turnover among child welfare workers and had no standard for determining whether its turnover rate was within acceptable limits (2006 through October 2014). In addition, neither DSS nor the state human resource agency collected complete data on employee turnover.
May 2006 - DSS' budget request included $8.2 million for 350 new staff positions. The General Assembly funded these positions for FY 06-07. Of the new staff, DSS requested 91 new treatment caseworkers.
August 2006 - The Legislative Audit Council published a "Review of the Child Protective Services Program." Issues found included: (1) non-compliance with state law or its own policy in CPS cases, putting children at risk; (2) failure to place individuals on the Central Registry of Child Abuse and Neglect as required by state law; (3) failure to meet national caseload standards for its caseworkers; (4) failure to properly discipline workers who violated its policy and allowed employees to resign before they were subject to any disciplinary action without documenting the policy violations or poor work performances; (5) several instances where individual counties had consistently underperformed on certain CPS performance measures (i.e. timeliness of beginning investigations; number and percentage of unsubstantiated reports in which there was a subsequent report within 6 months and CPS treatment cases with no activity for more than 30 days); and (6) actions taken by the State Office to improve performance in underperforming counties did not result in significant improvement. LAC recommended counties not be allowed to consistently underperform on measures without action being taken to correct the situation.
2007
State Director: Kathleen M. Hayes, Ph.D (2007-2011)
DSS created a Chief of Staff position.
Main divisions at the agency included: Family Assistance; Human Services; Child Support Enforcement; Administration & Program Support; Community Services; General Counsel; Planning & Quality Assurance.
2008
Main divisions at the agency included: Administration and Program Support; Community Services; General Counsel; Chief of Staff.
March 2008 - 6 regional directors were hired to serve as management consultants to county directors and staff.
2009
Main divisions included: Administration and Program Support; Community Services; General Counsel; Chief of Staff.
September 2009 - The Legislative Audit Council published a follow up report on its "Review of the Child Protective Services Program." Some of the report findings included: (1) significant progress had been made on recommendation to establish a system for ensuring compliance with requirement that children in CPS treatment cases be seen every 30 days, but recommendation had not been fully implemented (as of June 2009, agency records indicated DSS is only meeting this standard in 64% of its treatment cases); (2) percentage of cases in which children were not seen every 30 days and number of case determinations that exceeded 60 days were not included in its performance measures; (3) still no assurance allegations of abuse and neglect were reviewed by a supervisor and a treatment plan developed within 30 days of the case decision; (4) implemented recommendation to start monitoring the Central Registry of Abuse and Neglect to ensure it was properly maintained and perpetrators were either taken to court to obtain a court order for placement in the registry or names were entered in the registry where the agency already had a court order; (5) DSS stated its budgetary considerations had prevented it from doing a formal analysis to determine the number of cases a CPS worker in the state could manage successfully and how they should have been allocated; (6) several tracking reports that identified individual employees who had violated policy or law had been developed; and (7) partially implemented the recommendation to ensure that counties were held accountable for their effectiveness in meeting agency performance measures (no incentives had been provided because the agency reported it did not have the funds and no penalties had been imposed for counties that continually underperformed, but the following had been done to enhance efforts to monitor counties - monthly dashboard reports; increase in number of county directors (29 in 2006; 43 in 2009) and performance reviews for each; and addition of 6 regional directors to serve as management consultants to county directors and staff (hired March 2008).
2010
Main divisions included: Administration and Program Support; Community Services; Programs; Chief of Staff; General Counsel; 3,954.79 Authorized FTEs.
March 2010 - US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) issued Round 2 (Round 1 in 2003) final report on "South Carolina Child and Family Services Review" (CFSR). DSS was found to not be in substantial conformity with 7 of the 7 outcome measures addressing a child's safety, well-being, and permanency of living situation (6 of 7 in 2003) and 2 of the 7 systemic factors (2 of 7 in 2003). DSS would undergo Round 3 of the CFSR in FY 2017.
2011
Governor: Nikki Haley (Republican) (2011-Present)
State Director: Lillian Koller (January 2011 - June 2014)
The positions of Deputy for Administration and Chief of Staff were eliminated.
The position of Deputy for Economic Services was created.
Main divisions: Economic Services; Human Services; General Counsel; CSES Project; Internal Audit; 3,953.79 Authorized FTEs.
DSS implemented the Child Welfare Basic (CWB) training program for new caseworkers, which provided the knowledge and skills necessary for quality services to children and families. County and regional offices indicated that, upon completion of CWB training, caseworkers demonstrated the required competencies.
2012
Main divisions: Economic Services; Human Services; CSES Project; Internal Audit
54% of the employees who completed exit surveys stated the reason they were leaving was (1) lack of supervisory support/employee recognition, (2) better advancement or (3) higher pay.
DSS implemented Community Based Prevention Services (CBPS), a statewide initiative focusing on families referred to DSS that did not meet the threshold definitions of child abuse or neglect or substantial risk of harm, and, therefore, would not have triggered an investigation upon intake. Under the agency's traditional model, employees were often faced with the stark choice between taking no action on a case and taking action on a case that was not warranted given the facts of a report. The implementation of CBPS provided employees with an alternative that provides at-risk families with resources that were previously unavailable.
2013
Child Support Enforcement was moved to report to the State Director.
Main divisions: Economic Services; Human Services; CSES Project; Internal Audit.
There were 856 caseworkers and supervisors in Child Welfare Services.
49% of the employees who completed exit surveys stated the reason they were leaving was (1) lack of supervisory support/employee recognition, (2) better Advancement, or (3) higher pay.
February 2013 - DSS started a new career path for CPS line workers and established a new position description called "Performance Coach" with the intention of reclassifying and promoting certain accomplished CPS line workers to help other CPS line workers in their areas of expertise to improve performance through the Performance Coach's mentorship.
Agency also began process of creating a structured career path to advance employees through their current band or to other classifications (as of July 2014 DSS was still in the process of developing this career path).
2014
71% of the employees who completed exit surveys stated the reason they were leaving was (1) lack of supervisory support/employee recognition, (2) better advancement, or (3) higher pay.
February 2014 - The National Resource Center for Child Protective Services conducted a review of DSS' Intake Assessment Tool and found that it contained the right factors to determine whether the facts indicated a need for an investigation or a prevention response.
March 2014 - Senate called for the hearings after a series of cases pertaining to children dying in DSS care or oversight.
May 2014 - DSS developed a comprehensive plan to expedite the process of bringing staff onboard. Progress as of October 2, 2014 included: (1) New positions were funded within the existing budget; (2) Increased hiring across the state; (3) Streamlined the hiring process to allow counties to fill vacancies more quickly; (4) Instituted group interview process for identifying the most qualified candidates for second interviews; and (5) Ongoing collaboration with DEW and other agencies.
June 2014 - DSS submitted, for the first time ever, caseload standards to the federal Administration for Children and Families. DSS did not have standards for the maximum number of families or children assigned to each child welfare caseworker until this time. Maximum caseloads standards submitted by DSS included 24 children for assessment caseworkers, 24 children for treatment caseworkers and 20 children for foster care caseworkers. DSS reported that due to limited resources, it had not implemented the standards. LAC found that 57.8% of the 611 county caseworkers statewide had combined caseloads that exceeded DSS standards (38.5% had caseloads that exceeded the standards by 50% or more, 21.9% had caseloads that exceeded the standards by 100% or more, and 11.3% had caseloads that exceeded the standards by 150% or more.) Statewide, 19.3% of caseworkers were assigned more than 50 children, 11.3% were assigned more than 60 children, and 2.8% were assigned more than 75 children.
August 2014 - DSS issued a directive memo stating that all caseworkers, not just those who screened and assessed reports of child abuse and neglect, were required to be certified (this requirement was not listed in DSS' training policy).
September - DSS memorandum stated that caseworkers must receive 20 hours of continuing education each year.
October 2014 - LAC published a "Review of Child Welfare Services" at DSS, finding significant issues with the way DSS provides these services and how it measures its performance. Some of the issues included: (1) caseworkers were not required to have a college degree in a field related to their social work nor previous relevant experience; (2) caseworkers were not being adequately compensated in comparison to comparable employees (avg. minimum salary was $29,797 in 2006 and in 2014 was $30,582; entry level caseworkers paid less than the average minimum salary of comparable workers in 42 states); (3) DSS had unclear policies regarding training and certification for caseworkers after they had been hired and no central records that documented whether caseworkers have been trained and certified (this has been an issue for 30 years, in LAC's 1985 review of DSS, they found only screening and assessment workers were required to be certified and DSS did not maintain adequate central records of caseworker training and certification); (4) DSS took as long as nine months to hire and train a new child welfare caseworker; (5) caseworkers were being forced to manage excessive caseloads (this had been an issue for 30 years, LAC's 1985 and 2006 reports stated that DSS did not have maximum caseload standards for its child welfare caseworkers; formal methodology for calculating caseloads; nor policy that required caseloads be approximately equal from county to county - in 2014, LAC found the same issues; state law did not require DSS to have a formal written methodology for calculating caseloads nor for caseworker caseloads to be approximately equal from county to county); (6) DSS did not have a systematic process for allocating child welfare staff among its state, regional, and county offices (this had been an issue for 30 years, LAC's 1985 and 2006 reports recommended that DSS develop a methodology for allocating staff - DSS stated that staffing decisions were a product of management discretion, after considering available resources and needs throughout the organization); (7) DSS did not have a structured system for minimizing turnover among child welfare workers and county directors; (8) data being reported to the General Assembly on the occurrence of child fatality, especially among children who had prior involvement with the agency, was not reliable and not useful to measure the agency's performance; (9) about 25% of children whose abuse or neglect reports were accepted by the agency for investigation were not seen within 24 hours; (10) use of private contractors for case management reduced the rate of in-person contact between agency employees and potential victims of neglect and abuse; (11) the agency did not always use a competitive procurement process for major services and partnership contracts, resulting in contracts worth as much as almost $51,000,000 with vendors that were likely not the best combination of price and quality, creating the perception of favoritism in the agency's contracting process (i.e. contract between DSS and Winthrop University for $20 million and two other contracts between DSS and USC for $50.8 million were the result of non-competitive procurement methods - LAC objected to DSS' use of cost justification, an exemption from competition, to enter into MOUs with USC and Winthrop but LAC did not find the process was used incorrectly); and (12) DSS had developed multiple measures of child welfare service performance that could have been useful in quantifying underperformance but DSS had given insufficient attention to determining the root causes of underperformance.
November 2014 - Salary increase for county child welfare caseworkers and supervisors (new positions hired on or after October 2, 2014, are on-boarded at new base salary). 67 new caseworker assistant positions were allocated to counties to provide support to frontline practitioners, allowing them to increase their face-to-face time with children and families.
December 2014 - Susan Alford was named State Director
2015
State Director: Susan Alford (December 2014 - Present)
The position of the Deputy for Administration was reestablished.
82% of the employees who completed exit surveys stated the reason they were leaving was (1) lack of supervisory support/employee recognition, (2) better advancement, or (3) higher pay (risen from 54% in 2012 and 71% in 2014).
January 1, 2015 - Scheduled start date for implementation of a regionalized intake plan for CPS. The regional intake system is supposed to: (1) Improve consistency in screening calls at intake by having dedicated staff involved in the intake process and by honing the skills of intake practitioners; (2) Improve the speed of accepting and processing referrals; callers will not have to wait to make referrals due to lack of available intake practitioners; intake practitioners will enter referrals directly into DSS database, making them instantly available to designate responders (DSS investigators and prevention partners); (3) Increase the expertise of dedicated intake practitioners through the provision of mandatory training and on-going coaching; (4) Improve the consistency and quality of data in Child and Adult Protective Services System (CAPSS) for both referrals and resource linkages; and (5) Increase the capacity of local management by lessening their scope of practice.
Starting in early 2015, teams of DSS Human Services staff from across the state began working to improve the work processes involved in CPS Assessments. These teams, led by business process redesign experts, are developing recommendations to improve the quality and efficiency of the work performed in child welfare services. Specifically, modifications to existing procedures have been identified that will cut down on the overall time it takes for the agency to deliver a service while preserving and improving the quality of that service.
March 25, 2015 - Senate General Committee, DSS Oversight Subcommittee, Report and Recommendations released.
Budget request from agency for 2015-16 included $8.4 million for 262 new full time staff positions and salary increases. The General Assembly funded these new positions and salary increases. Of the new staff, DSS requested 177 caseworkers, 6 caseworker supervisors and 67 caseworker assistants. A complete listing of this portion of the budget request is as follows: 177 new Caseworker FTEs; 6 new Caseworker Supervisor FTEs; Additional funding for 76 currently unfunded FTEs; 67 new Caseworker Assistant FTEs; 2 new Attorney FTEs; 2 new Paralegal FTEs; 4 new HR Manager FTEs to aid in recruitment efforts and $2,112,990 in salary increases (15% for Child Welfare Investigators and Supervisor; 10% for Child Welfare, Adult Protective Services, Adoption, Foster Care, IFCCS Caseworkers and Supervisors; 5% for Child Support, Economic Service, Child Care Caseworkers and Supervisors; 5% for Clerical Staff and Economic Service Call and Scan Center).
Sources of Information
Department of Social Services 2015 Annual Restructuring Report
Department of Social Services 2015 Program Evaluation Report
Department of Social Services website
Act Number 261 of 1870
Act Number 100 of 1915
Act Number 561 of 1920
Legislative Audit Council. A Limited-Scope Review of the Department of Social Services, under "LAC Reports," under "Reports by Agency," and then under "Social Services, Department of," (accessed July 28, 2015).
Act Number 319 of 1937
Act Number 1203 of 1972
Legislative Audit Council. A Review of Child Welfare Services at the Department of Social Services, under "LAC Reports," under "Reports by Agency," and then under "Social Services, Department of," (accessed July 30, 2015). The agency response was provided by then Acting Director Amber Gillum.
US Department of Health and Human Services. Final Report South Carolina Child and Family Services Review, (accessed September 15, 2015).
Legislative Audit Council. A Review of the Child Protective Services Program at the Department of Social Services.
Department of Social Services, Business Plan and Strategic Outcome Summary State Fiscal Year 2005-2006, under "About DSS," under "Resource Library," under "Reports and Data," and then under
"Administrative/Accountability Reports" (accessed October 19, 2015), 4.
Department of Social Services, Business Plan and Strategic Outcome Summary State Fiscal Year 2006-2007, under "About DSS," under "Resource Library," under "Reports and Data," and then under "Administrative/Accountability Reports" , (accessed October 19, 2015), 4.
Legislative Audit Council. A Review of Child Welfare Services at the Department of Social Services, (accessed July 30, 2015), citing to U.S. Government Accountability Office, CHILD WELFARE Improving Social Service Program, Training, and Technical Assistance Information Would Help Address Longstanding Service-Level and Workforce Challenges, .
Legislative Audit Council. Follow-Up Report, A Review of Child Protective Services Program at the Department of Social Services, under "LAC Reports," under "Reports by Agency," and then under "Social Services, Department of," (accessed September 15, 2015).
US Department of Health and Human Services. Final Report South Carolina Child and Family Services Review.
US Department of Health and Human Services. Child and Family Services Review Technical Bulletin #7, (accessed September 15, 2015).
Department of Social Services, Restructuring and Seven-Year Plan Report, Historical Perspective Chart.
Senate General Committee, DSS Oversight.